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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper considers the shape that a “right to be forgotten” 
is taking in the online world, in the aftermath of the so-
called Google Spain decision, in which the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) found (against Google) that 
European data subjects had the right to request that search 
engines de-index webpages that feature in searches on their 
names.
The right to be forgotten is a contested concept. This paper 
considers various pre-Internet understandings of a right to 
be forgotten, arguing that, although it is linked to ideas about 
human and social memory, justice and forgiveness, and to 
social developments such as information management 
and the rise of bureaucracy, any rights in that area have 
been limited and partial, such as the treatment of “spent” 
convictions in the United Kingdom’s Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act. Only since the rise of data protection laws 
has a right to be forgotten become more general and feasible. 
The Google Spain decision is a plausible interpretation of 
the European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD). 
The paper explains how the court reasoned, and what 
measures have been put in place by Google in response.
The judgment, and Google’s response, raises a series of 
questions that are addressed in this paper. In particular, 
the judgment affects the nature of the balance between free 
speech and privacy on the Internet. Google’s presentation 
of its search as a neutral reflection of the state of the Web 
(and for that reason, a valuable resource for Web users) 
was found wanting by the court, and indeed Google itself 
has often adjusted its PageRank algorithm to improve its 
output by excluding, for example, spam, link farms and 
child pornography. Such methods cannot be transparent, 
since they would then be gamed by the spammers, and so 
Google has to present as a corporate “black box.” Yet it is 
a big step to devolve issues of privacy and freedom to an 
opaque process — even if it is accepted that a private sector 
actor can legitimately make decisions in this area.
The final section of the paper considers whether individuals 
might manage their personal data with flexible architectures 
that could act as points of contact for those wishing to 
use the data. Many of the issues discussed earlier could, 
in such a technological ecosystem, be addressed within 
a system that respected the autonomy of the data subject 
in providing limited abilities to control self-presentation. 
However, this remains a thought experiment at this stage 
— such technologies, though technologically feasible, 
are not yet the subject of great demand or takeup from 
consumers, while the state of current regulation means 
that business models favour sidelining data subjects from 
decisions made about the use of their data.
INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, the world of privacy regulation, data handling 
and the World Wide Web changed dramatically as a 
result of judgment C-131/12 in the CJEU.1 The so-called 
Google Spain decision confirmed that EU data protection 
legislation gives data subjects the right to request search 
engines to de-index webpages that appear in the search 
results on their names. The search engine is not obliged 
to agree to such requests — certain conditions have to be 
met and tests applied — but it is not free simply to ignore 
them. The decision drew on the 1995 DPD2 and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,3 and is 
consistent with a general direction toward more aggressive 
protection of privacy rights in Europe, as evidenced by the 
annulment of the Data Retention Directive, also in 2014 
(CJEU 2014). Nevertheless, despite these antecedents, it 
has been seen as a major step in establishing a right to be 
forgotten.
The right to be forgotten is primarily a legal concept, 
therefore much of the discussion in this paper will be 
to do with the law. This is not a legal opinion, however, 
and the authors are not lawyers. The right to be forgotten 
covers moral and political issues, and raises technical and 
institutional problems. Our issue as engineers of the Web 
is not only how we respond to the politico-legal debate, 
but also how to influence it by theorizing about the art of 
the possible. Any “solution” to the conundrums of privacy, 
deletion and free expression that, for example, balkanizes 
the Internet, will arguably produce worse effects than the 
problems it attempts to solve. This paper is set, broadly, in 
the current context of data protection. It will not speculate 
on how the proposed revisions to the EU data protection 
law will affect the position (Zanfir 2014), nor does it 
demand particular changes to or interpretations of the law. 
It will, however, consider the possibility of a technological 
1 See http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-131/12.
2 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX:31995L0046.
3  See www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.
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contribution to what is currently being fixed by a relatively 
controversial process.
The paper consists of four substantial sections between 
this introduction and a conclusion. The first considers the 
nature of the right to be forgotten, and what it could mean, 
closing with the debate that developed around it as the 
European Union began to consider revising the DPD. The 
next section will look at C-131/12, the decision of the CJEU 
about an appeal made by Google Spain against a judgment 
of the Spanish data protection authority, the Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD). This is the most 
visible assertion of data rights in the European Union in 
this area. The third section will consider a few of the many 
issues that this contentious judgment has raised. Fourthly, 
given this judgment and the controversy it has provoked, 
a discussion will be presented of the potential of one 
particular technology to deliver (some of) the aspirations 
of the right to be forgotten, and a framework of norms in 
which that potential would be maximized.
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, 
BEFORE GOOGLE SPAIN
Traditionally, the right to be forgotten has not been 
understood as a natural right; we have no offline analogue. 
It does not appear, for example, in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). When, in one’s 
medieval village, one committed a faux pas, the upshot 
of centuries of folk wisdom was that one would have to 
live with the consequences. In the splendid story from One 
Thousand and One Nights called “The Historic Fart,” Abu 
Hassan flees from his wedding in shame after emitting 
“a thunderous fart which echoed from wall to wall and 
silenced every voice in the room.” He travels in the East for 
10 years, homesick but too embarrassed to return. When 
he finally plucks up the courage to go back, hoping that 
everyone has forgotten, he discovers that far from having 
been consigned to obscurity, his solecism has become a 
temporal standard. A child asks his mother when he was 
born; she replies that he must be 10, because he was born 
in the year Abu Hassan farted. “And with these words, 
hope died in his heart forever. He fled the land and was 
never seen again.”
He might well have wished for a mechanism to suppress 
memories of his embarrassment, but the humour of the 
story revolves around the ways in which collective memory 
sometimes seizes upon apparently inconsequential events, 
over whose interpretation and (accurate or inaccurate) 
recollection their protagonists have no control.
Psychological Forgetting
Forgetting, of course, takes place, and has its uses (Schacter 
2001). One might put misdeeds behind one, or live them 
down. The passage of time helps, as does the creation of a 
worthier identity. One could even imagine the science fiction 
experiment of “editing” experience to remove unpleasant 
memories, as in the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. 
But this doesn’t help us understand a right to be forgotten, 
for two key reasons. First, the locus of forgetting is the 
rememberer; the right to be forgotten, by contrast, is a right 
to be forgotten, not a right to forget. If Z commits a faux pas 
in front of X and Y, X may forget, but Y may not (and then 
may remind X); Z’s forgetting the event is neither here nor 
there. Not only is the forgetting of Z’s faux pas a random 
event, but it is very unlikely to happen simultaneously over 
all rememberers; the collective memory, taken as the union 
of the memories of its members, is quite robust against 
forgetting.
Second, forgetting in this psychological sense is morally 
neutral. It may be that one’s good deeds help one’s youthful 
indiscretions be forgotten by a society, and that shows a 
mature society. However, it is just as likely that the memory 
of the indiscretion will hinder the creation of a positive 
reputation, or that a later bad deed will eclipse the collective 
memory of all one’s past good deeds, as Shakespeare laments 
in Sonnet 25: “The painful warrior famousèd for worth/ 
After a thousand victories once foiled/ Is from the book of 
honour razèd quite.” So even if society has mechanisms for 
forgetting, they will not always serve the purposes of the 
individual or of society. Clearly, this fact about psychological 
forgetting distinguishes it from the right to be forgotten, 
which all agree is morally charged (whether positively or 
negatively).
Thus, the disanalogy between the right to be forgotten 
(collective forgetting) and psychological forgetting must be 
kept in mind. In psychology, the individual forgets; in the 
digital world, the individual is, or hopes to be, forgotten. In 
the former case, the individual’s memory is wiped, while 
in the latter, the individual hopes to wipe the “memory” 
of others. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of psychological 
forgetting (or the failures of the mechanisms of memory) are 
still relevant.
From an information processing view,4 there are three basic 
operations that make up memory:
• registration (the transformation of input into a form in 
which it can be stored);
• storage (the holding of information in memory); and
• retrieval (extracting stored information).
Forgetting could be seen as another basic operation (that of 
clearing up used and out-of-date material), but it is more 
usually conceptualized in this framework as a failure in one 
of the three other operations. In an Internet-based analogue, 
failure of registration is not the issue — the assumption of 
4  For a review, see, for example, Gross and McIlveen (1999).
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the current debate over the right to be forgotten is that the 
information is stored somewhere online, and the issue is 
access to it.
Hence, the psychology of forgetting reminds us that the 
two relevant concepts are failures of availability (i.e., the 
information is no longer stored) and failures of accessibility 
(i.e., it is stored but cannot be retrieved). These map 
onto the ideas of deleting information from the Web and 
removing (some) links to it, making it harder to find, and 
correspond to, respectively, (a right to) erasure and (a 
right to) de-indexing or de-linking. Removal of all links is 
effectively indistinguishable from erasure, while removal 
of some links reduces the likelihood of retrieval. Clearly, 
the fewer links removed, the less the likelihood of retrieval 
is reduced.
Justice, Forgiveness and Bureaucracy
A related concept to forgetting is forgiveness (Margalit 
2002). Forgiveness goes beyond forgetting; it requires 
remembering, while ceasing to judge harshly. Paul 
Ricoeur (2006, 19) argues that forgiveness is not intended 
“to extinguish memory: on the contrary, the goal it has of 
cancelling the debt is incompatible with that of cancelling 
memory.” Horrendous deeds should not be forgotten, 
but we conduct our affairs in such a way that there is a 
route for their perpetrators to become useful members of 
society. Forgiveness, whatever its moral overtones, implies 
a learning process such that the original crime will not be 
committed again.
It has traditionally been hard to institutionalize forgiveness; 
it often seems to rely on individual case-by-case judgment 
that resists translation into systems. The urge to forgive can 
manifest itself against the background of a rigid, impartial 
system; the social justice of a system that is “blind” can 
throw up examples of individual injustice. Bureaucracies 
emerge to handle complexity, records are kept and the past 
becomes harder to shake off. The plot of Charles Dickens’s 
Bleak House, for example, revolves around the mysterious 
past of Lady Dedlock, the truth of which is painstakingly 
revealed from legal documents hitherto lost or concealed, 
with tragic consequences.
It may be that an individual can reinvent himself or herself 
— in American terms, by “going West” to new territory 
where the memory of the original wrongdoing is less vivid. 
Improved communications and transport links mean that 
one is not confined to particular locations. In Victor Hugo’s 
Les Misérables, Jean Valjean shakes off his convict past through 
travel to new places. It is no coincidence that the novels just 
cited are of the mid-nineteenth century, when urbanization, 
globalization and the professionalization of bureaucracy 
were beginning to have important effects on the lives of 
ordinary people. Collective memory became decoupled 
from particular locations and geographical communities, 
and its content and durability far less contingent.
Power and social status are also important in determining 
which features of one’s past or reputation will be acted 
upon in the present or future. Both Valjean and Lady 
Dedlock are in positions of power, but are undone by 
impersonal and unstoppable forces of the law that are 
devoid of compassion. In satires such as Moll Flanders and 
Vanity Fair, perceptions of the flighty pasts of young ladies 
are subtly altered by marriages, social position and wealth.
Forgiveness suggests that the debt of the past misdeed 
has indeed been paid, and that the perpetrator needs 
to move on, “to find faith in the everyday again and 
mastery over their time” (Augé 2004, 88). This is part of 
the justification for a right to be forgotten. There are many 
examples of permanent records that affect the individual’s 
social standing after taking a punishment or suffering 
online humiliation.5 In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
a 14-year-old boy found himself on the national news 
because he had “sexted” a naked image of himself to a girl 
who had shared it with others (BBC 2015). His action was 
logged on a police database as an instance of the crime 
of making and sharing indecent images of a child (i.e., 
himself), with potentially disproportionate consequences 
for him in later life (for example, if he attempts to work 
with children).
The injustice to the boy was illuminated against the rule-
based machinery in which he was caught, rules drafted by 
politicians concerned with the specific problem of online 
pedophilia and necessarily insensitive to the details of an 
everyday situation — ultimately, the same problem faced by 
Jean Valjean. This illustrates a paradox inherent in the right 
to be forgotten. If machinery for institutional forgetting 
is in place, it will be just as insensitive to the individual 
situation as the machinery for institutional remembering. 
In such a case, the subject acts upon their own initiative to 
show that the past information is outdated according to 
some definition, but without having to make the case to 
wider society that they have also moved on in the sense of 
being a different, better or more socially attuned person. 
Forgiveness morphs back into forgetting, as the focus 
of the system is on the information, not the person. The 
right to be forgotten would be a means of an individual’s 
regaining his “faith in the everyday,” but it would be his 
choice to pursue. Offline, forgiveness is a decision of others; 
a right to be forgotten — like all rights — is a matter for the 
individual. In a world of mass data collection, forgiveness 
may simply not scale. To facilitate individuals’ moving on, 
the power to decouple information from its social effects 
may have to be devolved to individuals (through a right 
to be forgotten, or other powers of deletion), not to wider 
society.
5  See Mayer-Schönberger (2009) for several examples.
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Forgetting and the Law
In more recent years, targeted forms of institutional 
forgetting, explicitly associated with a forgiving or a debt-
paying process, have been enshrined in legal practice 
for more or less utilitarian reasons. The rehabilitation of 
offenders has often been facilitated by reducing access 
to information about convictions once the sentence has 
been served. The UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
(1974) allows offenders to withhold evidence of “spent” 
convictions in certain contexts, such as applying for a job 
or conducting civil proceedings; a conviction is considered 
spent after a specified period of time (which depends on 
the severity of the original sentence) has elapsed since 
the sentence was served, as long as the offender has not 
since reoffended. It is, however, a very weak protection. 
In Germany, criminals’ names can be withheld from 
news reports once the sentence is served, which led to a 
high-profile case when two convicted murderers sued 
Wikipedia for naming them in its account of the crime. 
The German courts have developed a number of criteria 
for balancing the interests of offenders in protecting their 
personality rights and ability to reintegrate into society, 
and the interests of publishers, historians and journalists in 
writing publicly about such events (Siry and Schmitz 2012). 
In the criminal justice setting, the UK Law Commission 
proposed a requirement that the media take down material 
that might prejudice a fair trial if a juror were to find it 
(Law Commission 2013), but the government declined to 
implement the proposal in full, recognizing the “disquiet” 
the proposal had generated (Oswald 2014).
Such forgetting is seen as benefiting both the individual 
and society via the individual’s rehabilitation and 
reintegration. Amitai Etzioni (1999) has argued against 
this, that disclosure of convictions —for example, of sex 
offences — is a justifiable invasion of offenders’ privacy, 
given the dangers to communities from their presence 
within. In the UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, a crime 
that received a sentence of four years or more can never 
be spent, presumably on the grounds that information 
about a serious offence must remain in the public domain 
for reasons of public safety. Similarly, certain classes of 
responsible people, ranging from those working with 
children, to those involved in the humane destruction of 
animals, to financial managers, to (somewhat bizarrely) 
butlers, must disclose all convictions when applying for 
jobs, even if the convictions are spent.
Such laws are part of the tapestry of legislation, regulations 
and rights that might fall under the rubric of a right to be 
forgotten grounded in the general right to privacy, in the 
context of the public exposure of an individual’s personal 
life (Ambrose and Ausloos 2013). However, despite the 
term droit à l’oubli that is sometimes applied to them, they 
cannot collectively be seen as constituting a general right 
to be forgotten, if only because of their narrow coverage, 
focusing on convictions for criminal behaviour, and 
limited to specific contexts such as employment issues. 
The impetus for the development of a right to be forgotten 
has come, in recent years, rather more strongly from a 
different route, via data protection, which is concerned 
with managing the effect on individuals of information 
about them that is or has been publicly available.
The Debate over Data Protection Reform
The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union in 2009 made clear, for the first time, the 
status of data protection within the European Union. The 
European Convention of Human Rights, ratified in 1953, 
has traditionally provided the European human rights 
framework, and contains a right to a private life, but no 
specific mention of data protection. The DPD of 1995 provides 
for data protection, of course, but in the context of ensuring 
the free flow of information across borders in the single 
European market, rather than defending or demarcating 
particular rights. The charter is the first document to include 
data protection as a human right.
The debate over the right to be forgotten was transformed in 
the early part of this decade by a series of muscular speeches 
by European Commissioner Viviane Reding (2010), in the 
context of moves to revise the now antiquated DPD. Her 
speeches, floating the right to be forgotten as a key part of 
Europe’s data protection regime, caused an immense amount 
of comment. Initial debate focused on how far-reaching the 
proposal might be — would it mean, for example, a right 
to erase? Could one get unauthorized (or even authorized) 
photographs of oneself taken down from others’ social media 
sites? Would it ensnare private citizens in a bureaucratic net? 
Or, alternatively, did it refer to better enforcement of the very 
much more minor rights that are enshrined already in the 
DPD — for example, rights to have data deleted if it is held 
for longer than it should be, or to object to unauthorized 
use? Reding (2012)claimed that a right to be forgotten would 
clarify and strengthen existing rights.
The distinction between memory failures of availability 
versus failures of accessibility is replicated on the Internet. 
One paper made the distinction among the following: 
• a right to erasure after due process and time; 
• a right to a “clean slate” (i.e., regulating the use of data 
so that it is not used against you after a sufficient period 
has elapsed); and 
• a right to free expression without the danger that your 
utterances or behaviour will be used against you in 
future. 
The first is a reduction of availability, while the second 
and third are reductions of accessibility (Koops 2011). 
Most commentators argued, or assumed, that a right to 
be forgotten, if it was to extend beyond the current data 
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protection right to erase false content, must be tantamount 
to a right to erasure (Bernal 2011; Markou 2014). Meanwhile, 
web scientists estimated how technically feasible some of 
the more draconian interpretations might be, usually with 
negative results (O’Hara 2012).
The lack of a defined context produced something 
of a vacuum that was filled with commentary (some 
thought that the use of the term “right to be forgotten” 
was inflammatory and probably going to be misleading 
[Markou 2014]). Jeffrey Rosen (2012) called this a 
“proposal to create a sweeping new privacy right,” which 
“represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet 
in the coming decade.” A leading Google lawyer called the 
right to be forgotten “foggy thinking” (Fleischer 2011). 
Meanwhile, many scholars argued that some kind of right 
to be forgotten was already implicit in the network of data 
protection jurisprudence (Zanfir 2014), although there was 
little guidance to date about how a data controller might 
strike the balance between the right to be forgotten and 
exceptions where that right could be overridden (Ambrose 
and Ausloos 2013), and some in Europe argued that these 
rights, if they existed, were limited in scope and no big 
deal anyway (Ausloos 2012). Mayer-Schönberger argued 
that all data should have an expiration date, so that 
forgetting became a default — although it was hard to see 
how that suggestion would help with issues such as the 
greater powers of the search engines and social networks 
(not to mention governments) to set the terms of data 
collection, and so his idea probably serves the purpose 
of (first-person) forgetting, more so than the desire to be 
forgotten (Mayer-Schönberger 2009).
The root of this dispute was the philosophical divergence 
between the United States and the European Union on 
privacy. In the former, it is taken to facilitate liberty, while 
in the latter it supports dignity, and conceptions differ 
according to how privacy should interact with other 
norms and institutions to produce different desired effects 
(Post 2001; Whitman 2004). Furthermore, the US First 
Amendment is one of the most complete protections of 
free speech, and is prioritized over many other rights. For 
instance, the right to free speech was recently taken as the 
basis for calling some restrictions on political campaign 
finance unconstitutional, for example, in the cases of 
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 2010 and 
McCutcheon et al v Federal Election Commission 2014 (Mutch 
2014). There would seem little doubt that a right to be 
forgotten, however it was enacted, would fall foul of First 
Amendment rights — hence Rosen’s response. 
THE GOOGLE SPAIN DECISION
The Google Spain decision C131-12 (European Commission 
2014) was based on a case brought by Google Spain against 
the AEPD. The AEPD had, from 2007 on, pursued a couple 
of hundred similar cases in which individuals protested 
that data about them online, although true, was excessive 
or outdated (Daley 2011). These are cardinal sins in the 
data protection world — the DPD specifically requires that 
data should be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are processed;… 
such purposes must be explicit and legitimate and must 
be determined at the time of collection of the data; [and] 
the purposes of processing further to collection shall not 
be incompatible with the purposes as they were originally 
specified” (Recital 28).6 Nevertheless, this was something 
of a lone crusade for the AEPD, which was not generally 
supported or copied by other data protection authorities 
(DPAs).7
The cases the AEPD took on often resulted from digitization, 
of newspaper archives or public gazettes, for example. 
Minor but embarrassing judgments (a conviction for 
urinating in a public street, for example) became prominent 
for certain citizens via Google searches. Sometimes the 
newspaper archive did not tell the full story. A charge or 
a conviction would be reported, but the acquittal or the 
successful appeal would not, so the archive, although it 
told the truth, could not be said to have told the whole 
truth, and taken in toto could be seriously misleading. 
The problems are sometimes less with the content of the 
webpages, and more with the style of presentation of the 
search results. For example, given that result ordering is 
crucial, there are many cases where the charge/conviction 
features prominently in the first couple of pages of search 
results, but the acquittal/appeal appears so low down that 
a searcher would be unlikely to get that far. Sometimes, 
the problem is not that the webpage’s information is 
misleading, but the extract from the page that accompanies 
the result gives a false impression.
The objection raised by the person who brought the 
key case against Google Spain was against information 
he argued to be outdated and irrelevant to his current 
professional life. Some time previously, after some issues 
with his tax authority, his home had been repossessed and 
auctioned off. The auction was publicized in a newspaper 
in order to help maximize revenue for the auction. Once 
the newspaper’s archive was digitized, the auction 
notice resurfaced, and the complainant argued that his 
privacy was being infringed because the proceedings 
had been fully resolved for several years, they were 
irrelevant to his current life and indeed had the potential 
to harm his professional career. He therefore argued 
that the newspaper should take down the piece from its 
6  In general, article 6 of the DPD provides five data quality principles. 
Data must be: processed fairly and lawfully; collected for specific and 
explicit purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive relative to those 
purposes; accurate and up to date; and kept in a form where data subjects 
are identifiable for no longer than required for the purpose.
7  See, for example, Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (2011), 
which is somewhat lukewarm toward the evolving proposals.
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archive, and that Google Spain should cease to index it 
in searches on his name. Although the AEPD rejected his 
case against the newspaper, whose archival function it 
respected, it found in his favour with respect to the search 
engine (thereby implicitly endorsing the complainant’s 
assessment of the information), and Google Spain took the 
case to a resolution in the CJEU.
It is fair to say that many observers thought that the 
AEPD was not going to succeed in the case, particularly 
when the advocate-general, the CJEU’s special adviser on 
legal matters, upheld crucial parts of Google Spain’s case 
(European Commission 2013; Lynskey 2013). However, the 
court chose to reject the advocate-general’s non-binding 
view, and came down in favour of the AEPD’s original 
decision.
The Substance of the Judgment
In its judgment, the CJEU rejected all four key aspects 
of Google Spain’s defence. Its responses to the italicized 
defences are summarized in the next four paragraphs.
• Search is not data processing: it involves locating, indexing 
and even temporarily storing data, but not processing. 
The DPD is clear that processing happens when data 
is “collected,” “organized,” “stored,” “retrieved,” 
“disclosed,” etc. (article 2(b)), and the court was clear 
that this was indeed happening.
• The European Union has no jurisdiction over the case, as the 
search engine was run from the United States by Google Inc., 
while Google Spain, which does fall under its jurisdiction, 
does no processing. The CJEU ruled that Google Spain is 
an EU establishment, as it is based in Spain (this was not 
in contention). Furthermore, Google Inc.’s processing 
of the data took place in the context of the activities 
of Google Spain (on the territory of the member state 
Spain) that were “intended to promote and sell… 
advertising space offered by the search engine which 
serves to make the service offered by that engine 
profitable.” Hence the search engine’s data processing, 
even though it happened in the United States, took 
place within the context of Google Spain’s business (it 
wouldn’t have happened otherwise), which, the court 
argued, brought the processing within the European 
Union’s jurisdiction.
• Neither Google Spain nor Google Inc. is a data controller; 
they are merely passive intermediaries that make no 
distinction between personal data8 and other kinds of data, 
have no control over it, and make no decisions relating to its 
8  Personal data is defined in the DPD as data from which an 
individual is identifiable. Different data protection acts implement the 
DPD across the European Union, and these differ in their interpretation 
of “identifiable.” For instance, the UK Data Protection Act specifically 
defines “identifiable” as “identifiable by the data controller,” which 
weakens its privacy-protecting provisions relative to other acts. 
management. This was the key contention, with which 
the advocate-general concurred, arguing that to be a 
controller, “the data processing must appear to him 
as processing of personal data, that is ‘information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person’ in some semantically relevant way and not a 
mere computer code” (European Commission 2013). 
However, the CJEU rejected the argument because the 
search engine “determined the purposes and means of 
processing” within the context of the activities of Google 
Spain. This processing, controlled by Google Inc., was 
the subject of the case, not the processing performed 
by third-party webmasters, and it consisted in the 
creation of “a structured overview of the information” 
relating to the individual searched for, which could 
not be created in the absence of the search engine. 
The processing of personal data by search engines is 
distinct from and additional to that of the third parties, 
and also plays a decisive role in its dissemination.
• The information was already public, and there was no 
right (and Google had no power) to erase it. The court 
agreed that the information did not have to be 
taken down, assuming it was true. However, it also 
concluded that Google Spain was performing an extra 
privacy-relevant function, by bringing links to public 
information together on a single webpage. In this, the 
CJEU followed the US Supreme Court, which had 
recognized the privacy interest in collecting public 
information, and the privacy protection of what was 
termed practical obscurity. A 1989 judgment argued that 
FBI rap-sheets need not be released under Freedom of 
Information requests because “a third party’s request 
for law enforcement records or information about a 
private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade 
that citizen’s privacy, and that, when the request seeks 
no ‘official information’ about a Government agency, 
but merely records that the Government happens to 
be storing, the invasion of privacy is ‘unwarranted’.”9 
In other words, someone wanting to know about the 
FBI could have access to the information, but not 
someone wanting to know about the person. The 
CJEU’s argument was roughly parallel (Goodman 
2015). The public information upon which the search 
results would be based was to be unchanged, and 
the information could be made available through the 
search engine as long as the searcher’s interest was 
not in the person involved, as evidenced by the search 
terms she used.
The Upshot of the Judgment
The victory of the AEPD showed that data subjects had the 
right to apply to Google to remove outdated, inaccurate 
or excessive information from Google searches within 
9  See https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/489/749/case.html.
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Europe, as long as they were searches for information on 
the data subject him- or herself. So, for example, if one 
had committed some youthful misdemeanour that was 
referred to in a webpage, then one could go to Google with 
a request to de-index that specific uniform resource locator 
(URL) from searches on one’s name. The webpage would 
remain online, and it could be reached via a different 
search — for instance, if one searched for examples of 
the specific misdemeanour, the offending webpage might 
legally appear in the search results. In the judgment, 
“forgetting” does not involve deletion, and so a right to be 
forgotten is distinct from a right to erasure. In that sense, 
the concept is somewhat closer to the notion of forgiving 
and moving on discussed earlier. Erasure is already a data 
protection right “where personal data storage is no longer 
necessary or is irrelevant for the original purposes of the 
processing for which the data was collected” (article 32 of 
the DPD). Furthermore, as this is a right, it is not necessary 
for the data subject to show that he has been harmed 
or the information is prejudicial; it is sufficient that he 
objects. However, it is accepted that archives have special 
requirements to hold information and to keep full records.
The key parameter to be provided to Google would be 
the URL of the webpage, not the information itself. If the 
offending information was present on a series of webpages, 
Google would only be obliged to de-index the particular 
pages of the URLs it had notified.
Google can turn down any such request. In that event, the 
complainant has the right to go to their national DPA (or 
straight to court), which can override Google’s judgment. 
The judgment suggested a number of grounds for refusing 
a data subject’s request. Although the economic interest of 
the search company was not deemed sufficient reason to 
overturn a European citizen’s data protection rights, those 
rights would have to be balanced on a case-by-case basis 
against rights to freedom of expression and of the media, 
and also against the interests of the public in having access 
to the information via a search on the subject’s name. 
The status of the complainant as a public figure would 
therefore be a contributory factor. Google has no obligation 
to inform third-party webmasters of its decision to remove 
a webpage from searches (though it often does), and those 
third-party webmasters therefore might, as far as the law 
is concerned, remain ignorant of a decision.
The decision only counts in the jurisdiction of the European 
Union, and applies to any searches carried out in the context 
of a business or enterprise established in the European 
Union, even if the actual servers carrying out the search 
are outside the European Union. Google Spain is certainly 
established in the European Union (as is Google Ireland, 
which sells the advertising), and so the California-based 
searching falls under the European Union’s jurisdiction. 
The court said nothing about what the limits were to that 
judgment, but the most probable interpretation is that a 
search from a non-EU webpage — say, google.ca, which is 
based in Canada and intended for Canadian users — would 
be unaffected by the ruling. However, searches within the 
European Union — for example, on google.co.uk, google.
be, google.fr and of course google.es — would be affected 
across all EU domains. Where Google has agreed to de-
index an item in one domain in the European Union, it will 
follow suit across Europe.
It is finally important to point out that the key part of the 
CJEU’s judgment was the finding that Google was a data 
controller. This role brings with it responsibilities under 
EU data protection legislation, and conversely if the court 
had not found that Google was a data controller, it would 
have been powerless. A data controller is defined as: “… 
the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data” (DPD, article 2(d)).
The advocate-general noted that Google makes no 
distinction between the personal data and the non-
personal data that it processed, and that it does not treat 
personal data as personal (for example, it does not try 
to identify people from the data it processes). However, 
the CJEU ruled that those factors are not relevant to the 
question; Google processes personal data, whether or not 
it is aware that the data is personal, for purposes of its 
own, using means determined by itself, and for that reason 
it is a data controller. But for that, it would not fall under 
the jurisdiction of EU data protection law.
The Implementation of the Judgment
Following the judgment, Google attempted to drive 
the debate on privacy, data, free speech and a right to 
be forgotten by setting up a neutral advisory council of 
philosophers, politicians and entrepreneurs. It reported 
in 2015 (Advisory Council 2015), shortly after guidance 
was released by the Article 29 Working Party of EU DPAs 
(WP29 2014). The two documents set out somewhat 
divergent views. The WP29 document emphasized the 
judgment that search engines are data controllers, whose 
processing of personal data is in addition to the processing 
done by third-party websites. It played down the potential 
impact of the ruling, but at the same time made the strong 
claim that “de-listing should…be effective on all relevant 
domains, including .com.” On the other hand, it suggested 
that the balance between the rights (and interests) of data 
subjects, and those of the data controller and the public, 
was perhaps finer than the CJEU had implied, and set 
out a series of criteria that would be relevant to making 
a judgment. The Google Advisory Council report also 
recommended criteria, but generally supported a weaker 
interpretation of the judgment. It recommended that 
publishers of information should be kept in the loop, 
informed of a de-listing where possible and given an 
opportunity to challenge a judgment. It also challenged 
the WP29 interpretation of the ideal geographical scope of 
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the judgment, concluding that “removal from nationally 
directed versions of Google’s search services within the EU 
is the appropriate means to implement the Ruling at this 
stage” (Advisory Council 2015, 20). The council wasn’t shy 
of asking a private corporation to make judgments in this 
space, because “assessing legal removal requests is already 
the norm for, and expected behavior of, search engines and 
other intermediaries in contexts outside data protection” 
(ibid., 18). Both reports recommended transparency in 
principles if not in the details of actual judgments.
However, simultaneously, Google constructively worked 
with DPAs to develop a procedure for dealing with the 
issues created by the judgment. The agreed procedure 
with Google is outlined below. It is likely that other search 
engines established within the European Union will 
implement something similar if they haven’t already, since 
they will fall under the scope of the ruling.
If someone objects to a webpage appearing in a name-
based search for them, they first contact the search engine 
to ask them to de-index the page from searches based on 
their name. There is a fairly Byzantine process in Google to 
do that — Google recommends that they contact the third-
party webmaster first — but ultimately they are asked to 
fill in a form giving the reasons to de-index. Based on the 
information provided, Google makes a decision. In June 
2015, the statistics released by Google showed that in the 
year following the judgment, there were 272,940 requests to 
remove 991,074 pages across the European Economic Area 
(EEA),10 of which 58.6 percent were rejected by Google.11
If the person is unsatisfied by Google’s decision, they can 
contact their national DPA, which makes an assessment 
and informs the search engine of its preliminary view. 
Information provided by the UK DPA, the ICO, reveals 
that the number of complaints at this stage in the process 
is currently small and manageable: in the first year, there 
were about 250 (Bourne 2015). In the United Kingdom, 
Google had 34,346 requests to take down 134,931 pages, 
of which it rejected 62.4 percent, which equates to 1.17 
percent of failed complaints to Google going forward to 
the DPA.
10  Actually, it is across the European Union and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). Switzerland is a member of EFTA but not the 
EEA, while at the time of writing Croatia is a member of the European 
Union but only a provisional member of the EEA. Both are covered by 
Google’s de-indexing regime. However, the EEA is a useful shorthand.
11  For up-to-date figures released by Google, see www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en.
In the United Kingdom, the ICO bases its decisions 
to uphold or reject Google’s judgment on at least the 
following criteria (ibid.).12
• Does the search result relate to a natural person (an 
individual), and does it come up against a search on 
that person’s name? Pseudonyms and nicknames will 
also be considered if the complainant can show that 
such names are linked to their basic identity.
• Does the individual play a role in public life? The ICO 
makes judgments here on a case-by-case basis, while 
recognizing that the public interest in information 
about public figures is stronger. One important 
question it will ask is whether the information whose 
de-indexing is requested could help protect the public 
against improper professional conduct.
• Does the data relate to an individual’s working life? 
Not all personal data is private, and the less the data 
reveals about someone’s private life, the more likely 
the ICO is to accept its availability in search results. 
Again, this judgment will depend on whether the 
individual in question is a public figure, although 
even such people have rights to privacy.
• Was the original published in a journalistic context? 
The law provides protection for journalism that is not 
available to search engines, so in that context, the ICO 
will take public rights to know and media rights to 
freedom of expression into account.
• Does the data relate to a criminal offence? The 
ICO takes into account public policy with respect 
to rehabilitation of offenders, and the existence of 
mechanisms outside Web search to protect the public. 
It handles these on a case-by-case basis, but is likelier to 
favour de-indexing for cases that are more minor, and 
that happened longer ago. The balance between public 
safety in particular (as many right-to-be-forgotten 
cases concern previous criminal convictions) and 
privacy is one that exercises the ICO in its thinking.
Some media outlets deliberately provide extra links to 
stories that have been de-indexed, for example via a central 
page linking to all such stories, either as a protest against 
a threat to their business models, or as a principled stand 
for free speech. This is perfectly legal, and is far less of a 
threat to privacy as the searcher would need to know the 
substance of the story in order to find something relevant 
to an individual. Such pages, as a matter of fact, provide 
researchers with interesting material for trying to work out 
12  The following bullets are taken directly from an ICO presentation 
of its policy toward right-to-be-forgotten cases (Bourne 2015). An 
anonymous referee for this paper pointed out that, although the ICO sets 
out its policies in terms of the aspects of the context that it will take into 
account, its resources are limited, and it may struggle to live up to these 
ideals if it were presented with a large number of cases.
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what kinds of requests are made. On the other hand, if the 
outlet republishes the content on a new page, then this will 
also circumvent the judgment (as it would be a different 
URL), and could lead to the search engine re-indexing the 
to-be-forgotten page. This, in contrast, is a notable threat 
to privacy.
ISSUES ARISING FROM THE 
JUDGMENT
An enumeration of several issues, positive and negative, 
arising from the judgment, can be found in Kieron O’Hara 
(2015). This section will briefly review a few of the most 
pressing and salient issues — in particular, the debate 
between privacy and free speech; the judgment’s implicit 
view of the status of search results; the jurisdictional issues 
that European data protection activism has thrown up; 
the transparency of the de-indexing process; the potential 
difficulty individuals have with information that is 
proliferating or being spread; and the barriers to entry that 
may have been created.
Privacy versus Free Speech
The law is not new. The CJEU’s task was to determine what 
was already implicit within the DPD, and it has argued 
that it merely interpreted DPD in the context of search. 
There is no extra right to erasure created, and information 
de-indexed remains online, findable by going direct to the 
site, and by following existing hyperlinks. Indeed, it can 
be found by standard search, as long as the search term 
is not the name of the data subject (it could be the name 
of another data subject who has not objected to the page). 
In this sense, the judgment has driven a wedge between 
rights of erasure or deletion, and rights to restrict access 
to information. The right to be forgotten falls under the 
latter, consistent with earlier critiques that erasure was 
not consistent with forgetting (Markou 2014), while also 
disappointing those who wished erasure or deletion rights 
to go further (Mayer-Schönberger 2014; Bernal 2011).
So, for instance, it could be argued that the financial 
difficulties of the original complainant should be accessible 
to, say, future employers or potential business partners. 
Employers could not be sure of getting that information by 
searching on his name after the Google Spain judgment (of 
course, they could not be sure of getting the information 
before Google Spain either, depending on what had been 
prominently linked to on the Web). But if they are entitled 
to that information, they can still go to official bankruptcy 
records to check. The difference is that in the latter case, 
there is a targeted search within the accepted scope of 
the employer’s interests, while in the former there is a 
generalized search for any information, which may turn 
up relevant or irrelevant material.
One of the judgment’s most controversial suggestions is that 
rights to privacy “override, as a general rule” (paragraph 
81) freedom of information and expression rights. This is 
debatable, but the claim does help counterbalance a major 
asymmetry between privacy and free speech. In making a 
free speech argument, no one asks Google to show that it 
(or anyone) has been harmed by the de-indexing of certain 
pages; the cry of “censorship” is enough. The CJEU, in 
rejecting the requirement for the data subject to show 
harm, levels the playing field between privacy rights and 
free speech rights. Granted, rights to privacy might have to 
be balanced against others’ rights (for example, the right to 
free speech), in which case the level of harm might become 
a factor in the deliberation. But it should not be a necessary 
condition in a rights-based discourse.
Yet some of the arguments that a right to be forgotten is 
a major blow to free speech have involved exaggerated 
claims that trade on the asymmetry. Speaking at an event, 
one prominent Internet scholar argued that a right to be 
forgotten was censorship. “It’s like saying the book can 
stay in the library, we just have to set fire to the catalog” 
(quoted in Roberts 2015). The simile is overdrawn. It is 
more like saying the book can stay in the library, but we 
will remove the single catalogue entry that refers directly 
to X’s name, while all the other catalogue entries remain 
in place (and we also, for good measure, keep the book 
in its right place on the shelves, so that you can also find 
it if you know the author’s name). That is not to say that 
such a measure would not also be controversial, but it 
clearly does not support the analogy. Similarly, Jimmy 
Wales’ argument, in his dissenting comments from the 
Google Advisory Council report, that publishers’ works 
“are being suppressed” (Advisory Council 2015, 27) is an 
overstatement of the actual effect on the publishers, if we 
take “suppression” to mean the prevention of publication. 
Not all commentators have gone so far. In his dissenting 
comments to the Google Advisory Council report, Frank 
LaRue argued that “we cannot make a difference between 
the information that exists, on files, official records or 
news papers, and that is obtained through a search 
engine” (ibid., 28). This seems like a category mistake — 
the information obtained through a search engine is the 
information that exists on files, etc. However, that is no 
reason not to distinguish between means of getting that 
information, given the privacy interest in dossiers of 
public information as recognized in the practical obscurity 
doctrine (Goodman 2015). There is little sign that this 
doctrine would constrain search engines in the United 
States, but it seems incorrect to suggest that there is no 
difference in either functional or privacy terms between 
1,000 catalogues of 1,000 documents, where each catalogue 
contains one document that refers to Person X, and a single 
list of the 1,000 documents that refer to X. The judgment 
assumes a significant difference between these two 
circumstances.
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The judgment should not inhibit serious journalism. 
A researcher in search of information about someone 
will have to invest more resources in finding public 
information, because the efficacy of “fishing expeditions” 
to find unspecific information is reduced. If the researcher 
or journalist is looking for something of any specificity 
at all, then they should be able to craft an effective set 
of search terms. The privacy threat to an individual is 
flagged by the use of the individual’s name as a search 
term. Yet, as argued above, there is no pre-Internet right 
to be forgotten, and so erasure is not supported by the 
judgment. History, in the sense of what information is 
available on the Internet, is unchanged.
On the other hand, search engines play another important 
role with respect to journalism, in getting journalistic 
output before the public. Removal from search results could 
have a serious effect on the dissemination of journalism, 
as well as its pursuit. However, there are exemptions for 
journalism in the DPD, and DPAs will weigh the public 
interest in having access to the information. As noted 
above, the ICO in the United Kingdom, for example, will 
take that issue (and other issues, such as the public interest 
in knowing about perpetrators of serious crimes) into 
account.
And as noted, a determined searcher is unlikely to be 
disadvantaged for too long. There are many ways around 
the restriction, which means that the immediate effects of 
the judgment will be relatively minor. The judgment does 
not go as far as many privacy campaigners had originally 
demanded (Bernal 2011), and favours impeding the search 
for information over the more radical measures of policing 
and restricting misuse, or erasure (Oswald 2014).
Opening the Corporate Black Box
The judgment rejects the claim that search is a neutral 
“black box” that merely reflects the structure of the Web 
at a particular time. A search is a construct that mediates 
between the user and the Web of documents, and its 
ordering is a key factor in the likelihood of a link to a page 
being followed. Google, as a giant corporation employing 
many fine minds, will be able to cope with the further 
overhead created by a right to be forgotten. It has, after all, 
mapped the world, its search algorithms are already able to 
weed out items such as copyright material, link farms and 
users of the robot.txt exclusion protocol, and at the time of 
writing it is planning to de-index revenge porn on request 
(Singhal 2015). Necessarily, much about these algorithms 
is confidential (otherwise spammers could game them), 
but that very confidentiality speaks against search engines 
being trusted, neutral interfaces to the Web. 
Google’s marketing and market dominance depend 
on trust in the system, which in turn rest on a myth of 
completeness; its search is marketed as a non-selective 
neutral instrumentation of the conversations on the Web. 
Even some who want a strong right of erasure argue 
that Google’s formal indifference to content should not 
be interfered with (Markou 2014). But, of course, Google 
doesn’t index the entire Web, and eliminates and ignores 
many sources of information, and so this myth should be 
dispelled. Google is not the Web, although it is of course 
a marvellous tool for navigating the mass of information, 
possibly indispensable in the age of digital networks. 
Neither is the Internet or the Web a privileged version 
of history. Even when an aggregation of pages provides 
a true narrative, it is not necessarily the whole truth (as 
with a newspaper archive publishing a conviction for an 
offence but not the successful appeal).
Google is a partial view of a partial repository of 
information. For serious engagement with history, or 
attempts to hold people to account for their actions, or 
defence of the public against harm, Google, like Wikipedia, 
is an excellent starting point, but a starting point alone. It 
is not the whole Web, and the Web is not the whole truth.
Jurisdiction
The Internet and the Web have often been held up as 
exemplars of a new type of space, independent of the 
constraints and confines of the nation state, perhaps 
most famously in John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace. More prosaically, issues 
to do with regulation and law enforcement across 
different jurisdictions have often been problematic, and 
regulators have tended to work at a slower pace than 
innovators. Data protection law is a classic case where 
different interpretations of EU and US law, and the right 
to be forgotten, as well as other privacy issues, have long 
threatened to drive a wedge between the two jurisdictions 
(Whitman 2004; Bamberger and Mulligan 2011; Ambrose 
and Ausloos 2013; Bygrave 2014).
The CJEU’s judgment has been implemented by Google 
only on its EU and EFTA domains, such as .es, .uk, .fr, .de 
and so on. The main .com site, which is US-facing, does not 
de-index pages on data protection/right-to-be-forgotten 
grounds. The rationale for this decision is that Google 
has a large share of the European search market, most of 
which goes on the national domains such as google.co.uk. 
Someone wishing to use google.com in Europe is diverted 
to the national domain, and it takes a little persistence to 
get to google.com (or indeed any other non-EU national 
domain). It is not much of a barrier to the determined 
(indeed, you can make google.com your home page to 
circumvent the defaults), but the power of default (plus 
linguistic preferences) means that most searchers end up 
using their national domain. This minor (but, in practice, 
significant) barrier reduces the radicalism of a right to 
be forgotten, and meets the desideratum that it protects 
Europeans in Europe, where data protection rights are 
recognized, while not protecting anyone elsewhere. For 
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most Europeans, their reputations matter most in Europe, 
and so the level of protection is useful and not insignificant.
This view is not universally held. Following the Google 
Spain judgment, little has been heard of Google’s defence 
that the European Union should have no jurisdiction 
over the actions of a US company operating equipment 
in California, but presumably that feeling has not gone 
away (a Republican Congress might one day consider 
the argument). On the other side, the Article 29 Working 
Party went beyond the CJEU’s judgment to demand that it 
should also apply to the .com domain, as this was (easily) 
reachable from Europe.
In order to give full effect to the data 
subject’s rights as defined in the Court’s 
ruling, de-listing decisions must be 
implemented in such a way that they 
guarantee the effective and complete 
protection of data subjects’ rights and that 
EU law cannot be circumvented. In that 
sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains 
on the grounds that users tend to access 
search engines via their national domains 
cannot be considered a sufficient mean 
to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of 
data subjects according to the ruling. 
In practice, this means that in any case 
de-listing should also be effective on all 
relevant domains, including .com. (WP29, 
2014)13 
The argument over jurisdiction continues, and will remain 
live for some time. At the time of writing, Google is reported 
(Fioretti 2016) to be about to implement a judgment from 
the Commission nationale de l’information et des libertés, 
the French DPA, to extend the right-to-be-forgotten 
procedure to all domains globally, having initially resisted 
it (Fleischer 2014). It will only apply, at present, to searches 
within European territory (so a European search on google.
com would be de-indexed, but not one from outside 
Europe).14 However, in practical terms, it is hard to see 
how the European Union could enforce global compliance. 
Furthermore, the same logic could be applied to EU-based 
search engines by more repressive governments.
The position of enforcing a right to be forgotten in EU 
territory — and not elsewhere — is enforceable, largely 
effective given the percentage of searches done on 
European domains in Europe (where most Europeans 
have their main privacy interests), and not over-restrictive. 
It respects the different intuitions, rules and norms that 
obtain outside Europe, while simultaneously remaining 
13  See also Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger’s dissenting argument 
to the same effect in Advisory Council (2015, 26).
14  See www.reuters.com/article/us-google-eu-privacy-idUSKCN0VJ29U.
consistent with the CJEU’s reasoning and the imperative 
for data protection within the European Union. It also 
appropriately constrains a right to be forgotten. 
Transparency
The original judgment gave little guidance as to the criteria 
for the decision to de-index or not, although since then 
the Article 29 Working Party has provided non-binding 
guidance (WP29 2014). Google’s Advisory Council has 
also given its advice on the topic (Advisory Council 2015, 
7–14). Google itself has made decisions on hundreds of 
thousands of requests, of which only a tiny percentage 
have been referred to DPAs. Teams of lawyers, paralegals 
and engineers deal with the many “easy” cases, while 
hard cases are referred to the executive level (Fleisher 
and Schechner 2015). Google, as noted, releases statistics 
on its decisions, which have stabilized at an acceptance 
rate of about 40 percent. It is certainly important that 
jurisprudence should emerge (Jones 2015).
There is no doubt that the decisions Google has been asked 
to make (and this is not a power it sought) are important 
ones involving censorship and information flow. It is not 
ideal that such decisions be privatized at all,15 but even 
given that privatization was the solution, it is essential 
that decisions be transparent. Google’s Global Privacy 
Counsel has argued that it is “building a rich programme 
of jurisprudence,” but this program is, in the words of an 
open letter to Google by 80 scholars requesting greater 
transparency, “built in the dark” (Goodman, Powles et 
al. 2015).16 There is, of course, tension between the needs 
of transparency and privacy, but aggregate statistics — 
for example, of categories of successful and unsuccessful 
claimants, or of the types of requests made and granted 
(crime victims? health information? false accusations? 
old and minor misdemeanours? political opinions no 
longer held?) — should be possible to generate without 
threatening privacy. At the time of writing, Google is 
considering this request (Collins 2015).
It is also possible that third-party publishers might be more 
readily involved in the judgment process (especially the 
media, given the protections for journalism in the DPD, 
although one would not wish accidentally to inform, say, 
a revenge porn site that a subject had invoked their right 
to be forgotten). This would allow input of more relevant 
information, from the publisher, into the decision-making 
process. It would also allow publishers to take a case to 
15  There is debate on this. Even on the Google Advisory Council some, 
such as Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, argued that “this is a typical 
relationship between a private user on the one hand … and a private 
company on the other hand ... [whose] right to decide cannot be taken 
away” (Advisory Council 2015, 25), while La Rue took the opposite view 
(ibid., 29).
16  Disclaimer: one of the authors of this paper, Kieron O’Hara, was a 
signatory to the letter.
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the DPA, which is important, given that most DPAs have 
the dual function of protecting privacy and freedom of 
information. The risk, however, with this option is that it 
would also allow publishers to identify and republish de-
indexed pages with a new URL, which would take them 
out of the scope of the judgment, and would then require 
the individual to make a new approach to the search 
engine.
Onus on the Individual
The system as it has evolved places the onus of work on 
privacy-aware individuals, and in this sense is part of a 
general trend (Van der Sloot 2014). In particular, they 
have to specify particular URLs to be considered, and the 
statistics show that the average individual specifies about 
three or four. Yet these individuals are less interested in 
making access to particular webpages harder than lowering 
the likelihood that someone specifically interested in them 
in particular can easily get hold of outdated or excessive 
information about them, or information that puts them in 
a false (usually bad) light. So interconnected is the Web 
that information is likely to be distributed across several 
pages, and may feature in a range of contexts. It may also 
be disseminated maliciously.
The key variable is not the webpage, but the information, 
yet the individual is not allowed to specify the association 
or information that is embarrassing, misleading or 
outdated. If information proliferates, they can only try 
to keep track of which URLs the information appears on, 
and contact search engines accordingly. It does not seem to 
be the case that it is easy to reduce access to information, 
particularly if it is widely distributed (pace Jones 2015). 
Indeed, despite the arguments of the judgment’s opponents, 
there is little evidence about how much individuals have 
benefited from it. Maybe de-indexed pages simply get 
posted under alternative URLs routinely, to reappear in 
search results. Without extensive evaluation, it cannot be 
known how effective a protection the system provides.
Barriers to Entry to Search
The final point that will be emphasized in this paper is that, 
although Google can cope perfectly well with the extra 
burden, this is because it is a well-resourced company. 
DPAs, in contrast, could not deal with all requests 
directly. At a point when the European Commission is 
concerned about competition issues in search (European 
Commission 2015), it may be a perverse effect to increase 
the barriers to entry to the search market by insisting on 
the implementation of a right to be forgotten by search 
engines other than Google. Having said that, it may also 
be the case that Google’s machinery for dealing with de-
indexing requests has been over-engineered and that there 
would be cheaper, more transparent and less burdensome 
ways of dealing with them (Powles and Floridi 2014). 
Ultimately, it will be essential to explore the means to 
increase transparency, and to make the interactions 
between search engines and complainants (and DPAs) 
more routine, in order that a right to be forgotten can be 
implemented without large-scale resources. 
Data Protection in the Digital Age
This section has discussed a number of issues arising from 
the Google Spain judgment, but their effects can be detected 
beyond both the individual case, and the relatively narrow 
class of cases to which the judgment applies. The issues of 
privacy, free expression, transparency and the asymmetries 
of power that have been discussed here all play out in a 
number of ways as our digital technologies record ever 
more data, and increasingly many of our actions and 
interactions are symbolized and recorded, becoming 
visible and shareable in new and unfamiliar ways.17 Our 
means of negotiating these difficult and uncertain waters 
will vary widely, and will include changes in law, social 
norms, business models and education. In the final section 
of this chapter, we will consider one possible technological 
approach that has been advocated in the context of these 
wider themes of data protection in the digital age, and 
sketch (lightly) a possible approach to rebalancing power.
PERSONAL DATA MANAGEMENT: 
EMPOWERING AND MAINTAINING 
TRUST
Currently, the discussion has been at the level of law. 
However, it is also possible that technology could play 
a part in the solution. There are a number of potential 
technological fixes for (parts of) the problem, including 
improving accountability for the misuse of information, 
enriching search with sentiment analysis, and a clearer 
process for reporting and dealing with disputes. This 
section will consider one particular technology that may 
be part of the solution, given the appropriate supporting 
background of regulation, digital literacy and social norms.
However, our aim is not primarily to argue for the 
introduction of this technology. This is a thought experiment 
— the idea is to show that a different relationship, mediated 
by technology, between data subjects and data consumers 
is possible, and that many of the issues arising from the 
right-to-be-forgotten judgment, and from problems with 
privacy in general, could be addressed in a different world. 
We will develop the thought experiment to highlight what 
is lacking in the current regime. In particular, if the world 
contained a vibrant market for personal data management, 
then more equitable relationships, with fewer information 
asymmetries, could be sustainable.
17  Two interesting and contrasting critiques of this new tendency are 
Hildebrandt (2015) and Zuboff (2015).
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Personal Data Management Architectures
The Web was designed as a decentralized information 
and communication tool, but recently this model has 
been frayed by the economic forces of network effects, 
technological lock-in and low marginal costs of adoption, 
which have favoured large corporations able to amass 
giant user bases for their walled gardens (Zittrain 2008). 
Data is harvested from users and consolidated in giant 
databases where analytics produce monetizable insight 
to the benefit of data gatherers. People are decoupled 
from their data, unable to manage, curate or police it, and 
identity management and partitioning are hard, leading to 
a lack of trust (Coll 2015).
One class of technologies with the potential to rebalance 
asymmetries and restore trust are architectures that allow 
the data subjects some measure of control over, or input 
into the exploitation of, their personal data, including both 
data they have collected themselves and data collected 
or inferred about them. Let us call these Personal Data 
Management Architectures (PDMAs), intending the term 
to be agnostic over particular architectures, affordances 
and business models. It includes, but is not restricted to, 
Personal Data Stores (PDSs) and Personal Information 
Management Services (PIMSs) (Heath, Alexander and 
Booth 2013; Nguyen et al. 2013; Ctrl-Shift 2014; Van 
Kleek and O’Hara 2014; Abiteboul, André and Kaplan 
2015). There is some skepticism about the PDS model of 
information management, often on the grounds of security 
or usability (Lemley 2000, Narayanan et al. 2012). The 
technology is certainly not mature, and although there are 
a number of products available there is still much work 
to do. Furthermore, regulation and business models do 
not work to its advantage. This paper does not address 
these problems directly, but as a thought experiment 
let us assume that next generation data management is 
possible, with a mature industry in which security and 
interface issues have been largely resolved. To reiterate, 
our aim is not to provide a road map of how to get from 
here to a PDMA world, but rather to envisage a different 
relationship between data consumers and data subjects.
The services PDMAs might provide include user-centric 
consent management tools, preventing external access 
to data except under approved conditions, negotiating 
privacy policies, handling credentials and even allowing 
access to rich sources of data from personal data collection 
devices (for example, health-care monitors such as the 
FitBit) for payment, free services or other benefits. It is 
important to note that such services do not depend on the 
PDMA storing data, and it should not be assumed that they 
will necessarily provide storage services (although PDSs 
do, and there is no reason why a PDMA might not store 
some data). They might merely point to data, or handle our 
interactions around it.
The PDMA could act as a privacy and identity assistant, 
with an understanding of context (such as interaction 
history), mapping multiple identities to different activities, 
and establishing trust credentials from those requesting 
access to the data. Forced identity consolidation as favoured 
by the walled gardens would no longer be appropriate (or 
possible), and data would have portability across at least 
some contexts. The PDMA would manage interactions so 
that external parties need not be aware that, for example, 
the employee of a well-known bank, the player of World 
of Warcraft, the denizen of a fetish site and the campaigner 
for immigration rights are all the same person. There is 
also no implication in this account that anyone would be 
restricted to a single PDMA. One could partition identity 
across PDMAs, and use them for different purposes.
PDMA technology is certainly not mature, and may never 
make a market breakthrough, but in this speculative 
section let us assume that innovation capable of providing 
the above-mentioned services is with us. Assuming a 
mature market of critical mass emerges, the Web, currently 
centralizing around the major platforms, could be 
re-decentralized by socially aware PDMAs.
PDMAs and the Right to be Forgotten
PDMAs might help with the de-indexing issues raised in this 
paper by being the locus for dialogue and interaction with 
search engines, publishers and DPAs. This arrangement 
would require the development of new norms and possibly 
new regulation, but would not require a critical mass of 
PDMA users to work. All that is assumed in this section 
is a PDMA ecosystem that would allow privacy-aware 
individuals to manage their relations with search engines. 
Nothing precludes PDMAs being used alongside other 
technologies to interface with search engines.
The following functions or practices, integrated with the 
PDMA, would help craft a holistic approach to the issues 
raised by the Google Spain judgment.
Storing details of information or data to which its 
owner would wish to reduce public access by exercising 
their data protection rights. This would include URLs 
of webpages with excessive or outdated information, 
but might also include a specification of the problematic 
event(s) or information. Given that information, the 
PDMA could periodically search for pages that referred 
to it. Discovery of a prominently placed webpage with the 
offending information would prompt the PDMA to contact 
the relevant search engine automatically, or to send an alert 
to the user.
Associating with this database of URLs the metadata 
that search engines would require to assess whether the 
criteria for de-indexing were met — for instance, how old 
the information in question might be, whether the PDMA-
owner was a public figure, and so on. 
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Cooperating with search engines. When a search came up 
on a person’s name, a search engine could also look for 
PDMAs owned by people named by the identifying string, 
and proactively look for offending URLs in the search 
results, and even look for pages containing the offending 
information. Of course, the engine would not be obliged to 
de-index those pages, but could test them against its de-
indexing criteria if it had access to the relevant metadata as 
well through the PDMA. Currently, there is no mechanism 
to allow search engines to do this.
Hosting dialogue with search engines, third-party 
publishers and DPAs. Whenever the PDMA’s owner 
invoked a right to be forgotten, they must expect dialogue, 
explanation and discussion of the importance or otherwise 
of the information, its context, its prominence in the search 
results, the motives for publication, the age of the incident 
reported and the owner’s status with respect to the public 
space. Such a dialogue would of course require careful 
monitoring of access and management of credentials. If 
the PDMA hosted this dialogue, there would be a central 
venue for the debate, and if another search engine found 
itself with the same right-to-be-forgotten case before it, it 
could immediately visit the discussion, to see, for example, 
how the DPA treated the case, and what courses of action 
other search engines had taken, thereby reducing the costs 
of enforcement of the right to be forgotten across the search 
industry.
Informing publishers. This is a risk, of course, but the above 
dialogue could also lead to a successful request to erase 
the webpage altogether, if it was sufficiently misleading 
or false to ring standard data protection alarm bells, if it 
wasn’t covered by exemptions for journalism or archives, 
and if the jurisdiction of the website’s owner was within 
Europe. The publisher may or may not be given access 
to the nature of the offending information, depending on 
how sensitive it was. Even so, at least the publisher would 
be able to annotate the database of URLs within the PDMA 
to give his side of the story. Such annotations would be 
available to search engines, the PDMA’s owner and 
ultimately the DPA (if alerted by another party), to enable 
a balanced decision to be made about de-indexing, both 
now and in future cases.
The PDMA, therefore, could handle the database of 
problematic URLs, the nature of the information to be 
de-indexed, the metadata, the discussion, the interaction 
with the search engine and DPA, and the requests for 
de-indexing — all in a handy place that can be readily 
accessed during a search on the individual’s name. And 
if a search engine wished to consider problematic pages 
proactively, then it could include relevant PDMAs in its 
search whenever it received a search request on a name or 
identifier. These functions would improve the interaction 
between data subjects and search engines in a number of 
ways.
First, it would reduce the effort for an individual to 
patrol the Internet (PDMAs generally have the aim of 
reducing data management demands while increasing an 
individual’s power over their data). The onus of complaint 
would remain on the individual, but searching for content 
could be automated, and so the effort required would be 
lower. The PDMA could handle communication with the 
search engine itself, or it could merely warn a data subject 
of a problem. It could also structure the complaint, based 
on the metadata it held about the offending incident or 
information.
Second, by doing this it would help rebalance the power 
asymmetries between data users and data subjects, even if 
only to a small degree. Third, it would lower the barriers 
to entry to the search market, by providing a guide for 
new entrants to previous decisions and actions by search 
engines, publishers and DPAs. Fourth, it would lower the 
burden on DPAs to collect discussion and argument in one 
place. Fifth, it would provide a route to introduce third-
party publishers into the debate to defend their position. If 
search engines played an active role in consulting PDMAs 
and annotating their databases — perhaps a big “if” — 
then the gains would be larger. The cause of transparency 
would be served, while much of the uncertainty that 
currently surrounds this issue — for data subjects, search 
engines, other data controllers and DPAs alike — could be 
dispelled. Search engines’ cooperation is also the simplest 
means of genuinely reducing the onus on the individual 
(rather than merely automating their responsibilities).
Why would search engines collude in redrafting the social 
contract between data user/gatherers and data subjects? 
One reason might have to do with one of the other issues 
discussed above, that of opening up the corporate black 
box. Much of the search engine myth depends on an 
assumption of formal indifference. They, in theory, do not 
care what their users say or do, or what they search for; 
they are non-judgmental. They want as much data about 
as many actions as possible, however subjective, to get 
a full picture of the range of human endeavour, noble or 
embarrassing, idealistic or cynical, significant or trivial, 
selfless or prurient. All that matters is that the data is 
captured.
This is an important picture, but it is an ideal. As noted 
earlier, formal indifference is an ideal that Google tries to 
approach, rather than expects to achieve — it weeds out 
link farms, copyright material, child porn and revenge 
porn. There are campaigns to suppress more content, such 
as real-life torture videos (Overton 2015). Yet beyond these 
special categories of content, data protection legislation 
provides a series of quality principles (see footnote 8). 
Augmenting the semantically neutral calculations about 
the links to a page, a commentary based around data 
protection principles — is this information outdated? Is 
it excessive? — is also potentially helpful for searchers. 
It is arguable that if information has been judged (either 
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by an internal process in the search engine, or more 
formally by a DPA) to commit one of the data protection 
sins, then its value to a searcher is correspondingly less 
than it otherwise would be. Thus the search engine, by 
taking this into account, is adding value to its searches, 
not diminishing them. Which searcher would prefer 
misleading information to relevant information? The 
information in the Google Spain decision, after all, had 
been found misleading by three courts and regulators.
Currently, search engines’ business models are usually 
focused around data processing, surveillance and 
advertising, but at the heart of the business is the search 
function, which competes on quality. Formal indifference 
is not a guarantor of quality; the moment search takes 
account of malicious content, a distinction is made between 
the “useful” web of content, and the “parasitic” web of 
spam. The Google Spain judgment has introduced the 
data protection framework as a competing quality vector, 
which may ultimately work to search engines’ advantage.
The mechanisms embedded in PDMAs described above 
would ease the requirements on search engines that 
took this line, by streamlining debate with aggrieved 
data subjects and DPAs, giving a voice to third-party 
publishers, recording the rationale for decisions and 
avoiding duplication of decision making.
Not all search engines would have to adopt this position; 
those that did, or those, such as Google, that found 
themselves legally obliged to, would find valuable 
resources for the task. It would also not be the case that 
each search engine would have to come to the same 
conclusion about whether a particular item should be de-
indexed or not. Not only would different national DPAs 
sometimes differ, but search engines might have different 
policies about when the quality of search results was 
compromised.
CONCLUSION
The privacy/free speech issues that Google Spain has 
raised, together with the potential jurisdictional conflicts, 
are not intractable, as our speculative thought experiment 
about new norms for interaction between search engines 
and individuals, mediated by PDMAs, shows. In particular, 
if search engines agreed to include consideration of 
statements about the quality of information on websites 
collected in PDMAs during searches on names, many 
of the conflicts based around the use of law to protect 
privacy, and much of the unfinished business of the present 
situation, would be ameliorated.
Of course, there would be a question as to why search 
engines might adopt such a code. One answer could be 
based on a revision of business models — the task (and 
cost) of remaining DPD-compliant might be eased by 
interaction with PDMAs, and there may be other benefits 
(for example, access to greater quantities of other data) 
that follow. Another reason might be that search engines’ 
own assessments of the quality of search results they 
put out could be augmented by the five data protection 
principles of data quality. Or it may be that the intangible 
benefits of goodwill and a proper respect for privacy and 
data protection would bring the tangible business benefits 
of corporate social responsibility.
Clearly, the use of PDMAs in the maximal sense 
would reduce the onus on the individual. Individuals 
are interested in protecting their reputation, and in 
informational self-determination, not in the identification 
of specific webpages, and are unlikely to have the resources 
to police the Web and detect every single threat to their 
privacy. An ecosystem in which search engines cooperated 
with individuals using PDMAs would no doubt not be 
perfect either, but the balance would at least be redressed 
and the task less Sisyphean.
It would also help open the corporate black box to sunlight 
and scrutiny. This would help lower the barriers to entry, 
as the PDMA would be an early port of call for a search 
engine, which would then be able to access any existing 
discussion relating to a particular complainant and make 
an earlier, speedier, more informed and less risky decision 
without the need to employ a complex evaluation process 
in all cases. Transparency may be an issue, however, as too 
much information revealed to the outside world about an 
interaction could identify someone as an objector to the 
dissemination of a particular piece of information, which 
in turn might alert third parties to what that information 
was, thereby counterproductively revealing what was 
to have been concealed (known as the Streisand effect). 
However, it would still be possible for search engines to 
flag all searches that may have been amended because 
of the right to be forgotten, as Google does now, and to 
release accurate and fine-grained statistical information.
The past is over; its interpretation is not. In our digital 
age, searches are not preambles to the interpretation 
and understanding of the past, neutral providers of raw 
materials. Search is itself a vital part of the interpretative 
process. This important truth must stay in the forefront of 
our minds as we work to regulate in this space.
It must also be remembered that this kind of forgetting 
(and certainly anything stronger) is a conscious decision to 
interrupt the flow of information. This is an active process, 
and so it is paramount to make sure that it takes place within 
a framework of accountability. It should also be ensured 
that records of the past remain accessible to challenge 
contemporary narratives and current tropes. Given the 
controversy that surrounds it, the scope and power of 
any implemented right to be forgotten should surely be, 
in the first instance at least, limited and constrained. The 
lack of an offline analogue, the potential clash with free 
expression, and the potential for the powerful to erase 
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traces of wrongdoing all point in that direction. In this 
paper, it is argued that the CJEU’s judgment, as currently 
interpreted and implemented, meets these desiderata, 
and that the technological resources to cement a new and 
more equitable relationship between data consumers and 
subjects within this framework are not out of reach.
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